LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 72:251 model dates back to the W.E.B. DuBois and Booker T. Washington debates, which concerned whether Blacks would come to rely on their own industry and hard work within a segregated United States or instead organize around integrationist principles.
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As scholars conjecture about the future impact of Parents Involved, most locate their discussion within the contexts of public schooling, overlooking the behemoth lurking beneath this pivotal decision. 6 To consider the decision as being meaningful only to the narrow context of public-school policy overlooks the legal context and social climate in which the decision was rendered. 7 Such a narrow reading of Parents Involved fails to appreciate the broader, potential policy implications stemming from the decision-policy implications that will likely affect many areas in which government decision-making relates to race. If this prediction is correct, there may be very useful, novel policies to emerge from decoupling race in government-sponsored programs. Perhaps Blacks will be better off foregoing government interventions in some contexts and worse off in others.
In this article, we consider one slice of this decoupling by examining a pressing healthcare issue for all Americans, but especially for Blacks: organ transplantation. Organs are a scarce resource. Commentators describe organ transplantation as being at a "crisis" stage in the United States as Americans participate increasingly in underground illegal markets in China, India, Brazil, and other South American countries. 8 Organ demand has increased in the past twenty years while organ supply has remained relatively constant. 7. As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor emphasized five years earlier in Grutter, forced integration will not be given deference by the Court, and only well-tailored affirmative-action plans in higher education will pass constitutional muster. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332. Economists, lawmakers, and politicians alike debate how best to increase organ supply. The current system for organ procurement is altruistic and frames the issue as one of "donation" or "gift-giving." As an alternative, a motley crew of academics proposes using incentives to promote organ donation. 17 They suggest that creating an organ market will increase supply. 18 But, like the current system of altruistic organ donation, the market solution has drawbacks. Critics warn that financial incentives will commoditize organs and create the potential for economic coercion, such as selling organs to escape debt. 19 In particular, they forecast that those most likely to suffer injury from financial incentives will be Blacks and the poor. In this article, we step aside from the incentives debate, as the limits of altruistic organ donation are well-vetted elsewhere. 20 Instead, we consider a thought experiment that shifts control over organ allocation from donor institutions to individual donors by allowing them to select the race of their potential recipients. We examine the utility of allowing Blacks to select other Blacks (or any group they choose) as the recipients of their organs. 21 Further, we hypothesize that by reducing organ demand among Blacks (by increasing the number of Blacks donating directly to others in their communities), all transplant-waitlist patients will benefit, for organs that may have randomly been assigned to Blacks could be provided to others. Grounded in the new-legal-realism approach to public-policy questions, 22 21. If social injustices result, the policy proposal may do more harm than good. But this is an empirical question as to whether utilization of racial preferences will be detrimental to general race relations. And it is a separate normative question as to whether marginal decreases in race relations are more valuable than gains in organ supply.
22. The new-legal-realism approach is commonly associated with the use of empirical models and testable hypotheses to understand the impetus behind judicial opinions. See piercing the veil of ignorance behind which less socially responsive policy is formed and argue for regulations that reflect the concerns and sensitivities of those individuals whom they affect.
In part II, we analyze effects of the current organ-allocation system on Blacks. Our analysis suggests that the current system's discriminatory impact coupled with a well-documented history of medical exploitation experienced by Blacks predisposes members of that community to distrust the organ-transfer system as a whole. This distrust in turn creates a disincentive for Blacks to become organ donors. Part III captures the crux of our thought experiment. In this section, we describe and contextualize the race-preference hypothesis. Part IV forecasts and responds to the primary legal objections that such a policy proposal might engender, most notably that such a system violates the altruistic mandate of the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) 23 or that the use of racial criteria is unconstitutional. Part V concludes.
II RACIAL PREFERENCES AND ORGAN-TRANSFER SYSTEMS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY AND A PROPOSAL
Proponents of radical changes in the U.S. organ-transplant system often claim that NOTA creates significant barriers to increasing organ supply. NOTA, they claim, is too restrictive. 29 Some doctors and hospitals refuse to perform these alternative transplants, arguing that even if the law is not enforced as to them, these types of donations violate the spirit of the transplant policy and harm the interests of waitlist patients. 30 Nor does it appear that the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), the organization that coordinates organ-transplantation policy for the U.S. government, is sympathetic to these entrepreneurial efforts to increase organ supply.
31
Programs caught under this type of scrutiny include novel Internet sites like Matchingdonor.com, which works like a cross between Facebook and a dating web site. Patients post their stories and potential donors read their biographies, looking for the story that triggers a connection or empathy.
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A. The Discriminatory Impact of the Current Organ-Transfer System
The current organ-allocation system is a colorblind process that relies on Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) matching of donors and recipients to determine the priority for individuals awaiting organs. 33 More important, with development of immunosuppressant drugs, organ rejection is less of a concern today than when the HLA-matching system was first developed in 1987. 40 The problem with organizing transplantation around such an antiquated process is that it reduces the likelihood that donors who are not "perfect" matches will give to third parties. Table 1 summarizes the disparity between Black composition on the national organ waitlist and as part of the population of individuals receiving organs. Blacks comprise more than onethird of the waitlist, however, they receive less than one third of all organs and less than half the number of organs allocated to White patients. (Table 1 ).
Our research reveals that the current prioritizing method for the distribution of organs may also contribute to racial disparities. From 1999 through 2004, the median wait time for a kidney for a White patient was 1255 days, whereas for their Black counterparts the median wait time was 1781 days.
43 Table 2 compares the median waiting time for Blacks and Whites on the UNOS organ wait-list from 1999 through 2004. In addition to longer wait time, Black patients also experience the highest death rate of any ethnic population on the transplant waitlist. 44 The data in Table 2 demonstrate that the current allocation system "generally ignores African American organ consumers and recipients, and focuses almost exclusively on the quality of their organs as donors." 45 The disparate impact of contemporary transplant policy is irrefutable. Blacks are systemically at the "back of the bus" for organ transplants and often die as a result. 41 There is limited empirical information available concerning the interplay between the racial disparities present in the organ-allocation process and individual choice on whether to become an organ donor. The available data suggests, at least among Blacks, a strong connection. From 2002 through 2004, the African American Organ Transplant Study I (AAOTS I) conducted an empirical assessment of 588 African Americans' perception of the current altruistic organ-donation system. 46 The researchers hypothesized that the existing differential between Blacks' approval of organ donation and donor registration was not due to registration obstacles alone, but rather to a more general, but overlooked, "breach of confidence or lack of trust in the current transplantation and procurement system." 47 The study was followed by forty indepth, qualitative interviews (African American Organ Transplant Study II, (AAOTS II)). Together, the two studies may have answered much more than the question originally addressed. They revealed that a more-subtle race tension exists when Blacks interact with the current organ-procurement-and allocation system-"participants perceived the altruistic process to be manipulative and a veiled effort to sacrifice African Americans to save White Americans." Average Across Ethnicities a physician, a nurse, and school teachers-believed that the transplantallocation system was biased, if not by race then by socio-economic status.
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Study participants were generally cynical about whether the UNOS allocation system benefited Blacks. One participant went so far as to suggest that "efforts to encourage African Americans to donate were part of a conspiracy 'because they were going to use Black people as spare parts . . . when White people are sick . . . they'll have a means to get their organs.'" 50 This data suggests that Blacks perceive a lack of control in the altruistic process. D.B., a Chicago area school teacher urged that African Americans should "stay together as a people," implying that African Americans should be able to determine the recipients of their organs. 51 Allowing for potential donors to control the race, culture, religion, or gender of their recipients may be one way in which an organ-transfer system can provide this type of control. Further data from the AAOTS I and II studies suggest the same:
For example, in AAOTS I when survey participants were asked whether they are registered to donate, only 36% answered affirmatively. However, when asked whether they would be willing to donate if the recipients were Black, over 58% answered positively. Thus, the concept of organ sharing is not the problem; fewer than 10% of those surveyed opposed donation. Indeed, Blacks were more willing to donate when they believed African Americans would be treated equitably in both the procurement and allocation process.
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The critical issue for Blacks with regard to organ transplantation may be control, or the perceived lack of it. After being asked whether mandatory donations would benefit African Americans, one participant concluded,
. . . because they are going to give it to the white person." 53 This participant suggested that even poorer, working-class Whites would be privileged by receiving organs over their Black counterparts. 54 Another African American teacher, Y.C., attributed present organ donation among African Americans to the desire to save the lives of other Blacks. According to Y.C., 49 . Interview with D.B., November 21, 2003. D.B., a school teacher, believed that African Americans were lower on the transplant waitlists because of their "socio-economic situation." D.B. also thought African Americans should be paid to donate their organs because of this. He went on to say that financial incentives might be acceptable if it provided a "means of breaking a horrific cycle which your family may be in as far as economics are concerned and you wanted your children to have a better chance at life to be on the same playing field as our white counterparts, I think that it will be a decision that I would make without hesitation . . African Americans participate in organ donation "because they want to insure that African Americans get the organs that they need." 55 AAOTS-participant responses suggest that the decision to participate in organ transfers is animated by more than the consideration of whether to give. And, in general, many express concern over destroying the sanctity of the human body or the ability to live with one kidney. 56 Yet at least in the case of Black participants, such choices are also ensnared with broader and complex racial considerations.
Earlier work suggested that the racial undercurrent present in the altruistic organ-transfer system may be due to unintended consequences in the allocation of organs.
57 Procurement and allocation are intimately interwoven. The system cannot give what it does not have, and how it presently gives has been characterized as pernicious, unfair, and inequitable. 58 But a deeper racial tension may also be at play. To deter organ donation, actual injustice and inequity in the allocation of organs is not necessary: Blacks' perceptions of the current organ-transfer system as privileging Whites might derive from broader conceptions of social injustice rather than from any particular knowledge of allocation inequity. If this hunch is correct, then even in the face of economic incentives, certain individuals might abstain from participating in the organtransfer system based on concerns about equitable distribution to Blacks. To encourage Black donation, a procurement system would have to compensate individuals not only for the value of their organs, but also for the value of participating in a system that reinforces racial inequalities and social injustice. In contrast, allowing for racial preferences in an incentive model might lead to "discounts" based on race.
C. Past Abuses of Blacks in the Health-Care Context Contribute to the Perceived Inequality
Historical disparities in the treatment of Blacks within the American healthcare system may also contribute to perceptions of racial inequalities and social injustice in the organ transplant system. Distrust among Blacks of the American healthcare system is well-documented. 59 This distrust may be "a natural and logical response to the history of experimentation and abuse" suffered by Blacks. 60 The use of Blacks in medical experiments can be traced back to the antebellum period; from slavery to the present, scholars document a troubling medical story that involves medical research and the absence of ethical or scientific protocols to protect the interests of coerced participants. 61 Among the more indelicate stories illustrating research and medical abuse experienced by African Americans are the gynecological experiments conducted by Marion Sims on enslaved Black women without the aid of anesthesia 62 and the U.S. Public Health Service study, otherwise known as the infamous Tuskegee Syphilis Study, underwritten by the federal government, and lasting over forty years. 63 Other incidents of government-sponsored medical studies and experimentation on Blacks included medical sterilizations targeting Black women on welfare and drug testing on Black children in foster care. 64 Reports about such experiments are troubling but no longer raise the allegation of faulty data, conspiracy theory, or hypersensitivity among Blacks. 65 Yet other experiments, confirmed by FBI and CIA reports, seem absolutely outlandish and are difficult to understand, as the data collected certainly provided little if any potential medical benefit for Blacks or other Americans. Consider the mosquito studies conducted in Florida and Georgia where mosquitoes were released in Black communities to determine the effectiveness of insect warfare on US Cold War enemies. 66 Equally the radiation studies, in which Blacks and poor Whites were injected with plutonium by government-funded scientists could hardly be justified to those communities nor meet the international ethical protocols of the time. 1499-1502 (1991) ; see also Randall, supra note 60, at 191 ("The Tuskegee Experiment involved four hundred African American men in a government-sponsored study to research the effects of untreated syphilis. While the men were not deliberately exposed to syphilis, as rumored, they were never told that they were not being treated or that effective treatment was available.").
64 dermatological studies conducted on inmates at Holmesburg Prison, most of whom were Black and did not reap the benefits of study's results. 68 By comparison, the highly controversial sickle-cell screening programs of the 1960s and 1970s seem mundane in their discriminatory reach. Nevertheless, those screening initiatives provide another historical reason for the unease and distrust that some Blacks carry as part of a community medical experience. Often the experiences are not direct (and may be significantly attenuated), but Blacks tend to view the harms, coercion, and fraud experienced by other Blacks as a collective experience. 69 In other words, these cases serve as warnings. In particular, the sickle-cell screening programs provide a glimpse from a different angle at medical uncertainty.
The sickle-cell screening tests were minimally invasive; however, participants grew concerned about how their medical information might be misused for untoward or unjust purposes:
Some states passed legislation requiring all African American children entering school to be screened for the sickle-cell trait, even though there was no treatment or cure for the sickle-cell disease. Some states required prisoners to be tested, even though there would be no opportunity for them to pass on the trait. Job and insurance discrimination were both real and attempted. The military considered banning all African Americans from the armed services. African American airline stewardesses were fired. Insurance rates went up for carriers. Some companies refused to insure carriers. During that period, many African Americans came to believe that the sicklecell screening initiative was merely a disguised genocide attempt, since often the only advice given to African Americans with the trait was, "Don't have kids." 70 It is perhaps this fear-rational or not-and grounded in isolated but not infrequent medical fraud, mishaps, and missteps that leads many Blacks to believe that core principles of bioethics (such as autonomy, beneficence, and justice) will not protect them or their families from medical mistreatment. A common thread in more than two centuries of research experimentation on Blacks reveals that the benefits of the studies were not intended for them. 71 It is also clear that, despite international human research protocols such as the Nuremburg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki, and the Declaration of Geneva, doctors and researchers persisted in unethical medical study involving African Americans, often failing to obtain full, informed consent, or mischaracterizing the nature of the research. Scholars might disagree as to why researchers ignored ethical protocols and well-established legal principles such as informed 68 . Jesse Williams describes in horrid detail the transgressions that he suggests were surreptitiously inflicted upon him by Dr. Kligman and his colleagues. Williams describes having skin removed from his underarm to "study the glands," injections of cadaveric tissue in his back, acid rubbed into his scrotum, and many other disturbing research experiments. Unlike many other unwitting participants, Williams was paid three dollars per experiment with Dr. Kligman Our theory is that Blacks are less likely to donate organs not because they are less altruistic or fundamentally opposed to such donations, but because of preconceived racial perceptions and fear of bias. If this is correct, then increased spending on government-sponsored advertisements targeted at Blacks will prove ineffective and inefficient. Blacks will not be swayed by the seductive appeal of the "gift of life" or "gift of hope" public-relations advertisements. For them, organ donation is burdened by history and race. Their concerns appear to center on two issues: (1) that doctors will hasten their deaths at time of sickness, which is relevant to cadaveric donations; and (2) whether their organs can save sick Black patients. 72 If we are correct in assessing the "tipping point" for Blacks in the context of organ donation, it is worth carrying out a thought experiment that assesses whether there is any benefit to incorporating racial preferences in organ transplantation. To this end, we are interested in measuring the social and economic benefits to Black communities and calculating whether there is a government, and therefore larger community, benefit that results from this type of hypothetical policy.
A. Allowing Organ Donors to Choose the Race of their Organ Recipients
Currently, potential organ donors must respond positively to a single binary question in order to become an organ donor: Do you wish to become an organ donor? 73 This question creates an all-or-nothing choice. Either an organ donor participates in the organ-procurement system by accepting the current means of organ allocation, including its disparate racial impact, or a potential donor may not donate at all.
Instead of a single question, donor-registration forms could ask respondents to select desired recipients by any set of preferences, including race, by checking one of several boxes. Alternatively, a respondent could simply indicate in writing the desired race of the organ recipient. not wish to select a racial preference for the recipient of their organ could abstain from doing so either by affirmatively checking a box indicating this preference or failing to specify a racial preference after indicating their desire to become an organ donor.
In some sense, this thought experiment merely extends existing practices. Private organizations, such as Matchingdonors.com, allow living donors to go online, read profiles of those in need of an organ, look at photos, and select their organ recipient. 74 Thus, selection on the basis of racial preferences is possible. Moreover, such web sites allow living donors to foster relationships not otherwise available through anonymous, altruistic donation. Though no financial consideration is exchanged, many donor pairs become influential figures in each other's lives. 75 Might the use of racial preferences to incentivize organ donations have nefarious distributional consequences? Some scholars raise concerns that White donors, who currently comprise the largest percentage of organ donors, 76 will use racial preferences to restrict their donations to Whites. As a result, greater racial inequality in organ allocation will occur than in the current system. Such predictions are plausible but less persuasive in light of our findings. The changes in the ratio of Black kidney recipients to White kidney recipients varies in both number of kidneys available for transplantation and percentage of kidneys directed within each race. 77 Expressed as a ratio, the current ratio of Black kidney-transplant recipients to White kidney-transplant recipients is 0.375. In contrast, the ratio of Blacks to Whites awaiting kidney transplantation on the waitlist is 0.88. Assuming differing rates of directed donation, only a marginal increase in kidney procurement from Blacks is necessary to alter the overall racial equality of organ allocation. For example, in Figure 3 , given no increase in absolute number of organs donated, if 50% of kidneys procured from Blacks are directed to Black recipients, there would be no net increase in allocation inequity even if up to 55% of kidneys received from White donors are directed to only White recipients.
By contrast, given no increase in absolute number of organs donated, if 50% of kidneys from Black donors are directed to Black recipients and if only 20% of kidneys from White donors are directed to White recipients, the allocation ratio of Black kidney recipients to White kidney recipients changes to 0.463. Unsurprisingly, this ratio increases as the percentage of kidneys directed to Black recipients from Black donors increases and the percentage of White within race donation decreases. Thus, even without increasing the actual number of kidneys distributed, a gain in social equity is possible by allowing some amount of directed allocation.
These calculations strongly indicate a few relevant points. First, the choice to direct donation by race might lead to greater equality in organ allocation even without a corresponding increase in overall donor number. Second, the inclusion of racial preferences is likely to stimulate organ donation to minority recipients. Blacks, who do not donate as frequently as Whites, might be drawn 78 Third, assuming all other racial groups donate organs at the same rate, an increase in the absolute number of Black organ donors can both increase the absolute number of transplantable organs and decrease inequity in the current organ-allocation system, even assuming within-race White donation will occur. Fourth, it is unlikely that the altruistic White donor who contributes without preference to race currently will make animus-based racial decisions simply because the opportunity is available.
Finally, even if the use of racial preferences causes some crowding out by driving potential donors from the current system or encourages some Whites previously unwilling to donate to share organs only within their ethnic community, the net impact will be positive for minorities awaiting transplants. The proportional decrease in demand from waitlisted Whites will increase the probability that waitlisted minorities will receive organs donated on the basis of HLA matching alone and without racial limitations. 79 Controversial though it may be, objections suggesting that racial preferences will polarize organ disbursement ignore compelling data that current efforts at transracial, colorblind organ transplant policy resultin a persistent racial impact.
B. The Economic Consequences of Including a Racial Preference
In addition to deaths resulting from unmet organ demand in Black communities, the disparate effect of organ allocation creates economic consequences. For each Black patient on dialysis, his or her family suffers the economic consequences of that lost income. The ripple effect of that economic loss extends to their communities, both through a loss of taxable income for local infrastructure, including schools, and through a loss of philanthropic donation to community organizations, including churches, community centers, and fraternal organizations. These contributions are critical in sustaining healthy, well-functioning, safe communities.
Blacks have considerable spending power, and this has the power to increase. In 2003, Black spending power was estimated at $636 billion, 80 a figure comparable to the gross domestic product of the twentieth-wealthiest country in 78. Black philanthropic preferences may more closely align with church affiliation rather than race. See Alice Gresham Bullock, Taxes, Social Policy, and Philanthropy: The Untapped Potential of Middleand Low-Income Generosity, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB POL'Y 325, 350 (1997) ("Historically, the Black church has been the core of philanthropy in the African American community."). This suggests that religious rather than racial preferences are a more appropriate "framing" to incentivize Black organ donation.
79. This assumes that White transplant recipients, as a group, are prioritized above Blacks on the basis of HLA matching alone. There is reason to believe that this is empirically true on the basis and prevalence of genetic markers in the Black populations. the world-the Netherlands. 81 In 2006, Black spending power was estimated at $799 billion, 82 a figure comparable to the GDP of the seventeenth-wealthiest country in the world-Australia. 83 Moreover, the projected percentage increase in Black purchasing power is greater than that of the overall purchasing power in America. 84 In turn, not only is the economic value of Blacks significant to the American economy as a whole, it is becoming more valuable each day.
In 2004, Blacks accounted for 38.3 million people in the United States, 85 and their GDP per capita was $17,728. 86 Even when completely accounting for costs saved from medical care and dialysis treatments, removing just one thousand Blacks from organ waitlists each year could add $17 million in purchasing power to the U.S. economy. If 2,225 organs are successfully transplanted, 87 approximately $40 million in purchasing power would be added to the U.S. economy. In addition, considering the federal savings from removing Blacks from dialysis, roughly $60-$90,000 is saved per year, per Black patient. 88 Again, if only 100 African Americans were removed from dialysis, $6-9 million dollars would be saved in the first year alone. Over five years, the savings could multiply up to $35-45 million dollars by simply removing 100 African Americans from dialysis. Consequently, if 100 Black patients successfully received a donated organ and were removed from dialysis, the net economic gain over five years could be $46.7 million. There is reason to believe that such numbers are underestimated. Transplantation is not only the optimal medical treatment but also the most cost-effective treatment for patients suffering from kidney failure. The federal government funds both dialysis treatment and transplantation procedures for almost all Americans. 89 Yet, after assuming such burdens, the Health Care Financing Administration noted that transplantation 81 was the most cost-effective means of treating patients with irreversible kidney failure. 90 Medicare direct dialysis costs routinely exceed $55,000 per patient per year. 91 Illustratively, congressional efforts to legalize paired kidney donation, which may spur transplants, could save $500 million over a ten-year period.
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More important, moving Black patients off of dialysis allows them to regain their lives and economic potential. The costs of dialysis extend beyond financial-they impact daily life. Treatments usually take at least three days per week and several hours each session, diminishing both quality of life and work potential.
C. Quantifying the Increase Organ-Donor Racial Selection Will Have on Supply
According to recent Gallup poll data, 62% of Whites are willing to donate organs, whereas the figure falls to 39.2% among Hispanics and to 31.2% among Blacks. 94 The survey cited high levels of distrust among Blacks to account for the low participation rate. 95 In 2005, the same year that the Gallup survey was conducted, UNOS data revealed that 1136 organs were harvested and transplanted from Black cadavers. 96 One study suggests that this number 97 Assuming such, it is possible to predict the number of harvestable organs that might be created by an increase in Black participation. If Black participation increased to the current level of Hispanic participation, 2135 organs could be harvested per year-an increase of almost 1000 organs from the Black community alone. If Black participation rates rose to the level of the national average, 2362 organs could be harvested from their communities-an increase of almost 1230 organs per year. Lastly, if Black participation rates increased to a level commensurate with that of White organ donors, 2817 organs could be harvested from the Black community-an increase of more than 1680 organs per year. Even assuming a slightly less-than-perfect correlation between organ transplantation and lives saved, the potential beneficial impact of such a system is compelling.
There are several reasons why the above calculations might both over-and underestimate the actual increase in supply generated by the inclusion of racial preferences in organ procurement. The calculations do not account for any increases in donation resulting from non-Black populations. Yet allowing greater donor control over the allocation of their organs might create a broad stimulant to encourage organ-donor participation across all racial subgroups. For example, Hispanics might galvanize around the opportunity to help other Hispanics through directed donations, even if Hispanics do not demonstrate a similar distrust of the organ procurement and allocation system.
The calculations above may also overestimate the increase in organ supply. Individuals who do not become organ donors because of personal or religious beliefs relating to the sanctity of the human body are less likely to participate in organ donation regardless of racial preference. A similar response is paired to moral objections to organ donation. This thought experiment identifies but cannot resolve current information constraints that may accompany the racial and socioeconomic status of donors. 98 As a result, individuals who do not donate because of information deficiencies or religious and medical fears of the procedure itself will likely remain outside of the system. and heart transplants. 100 The UAGA permits a competent adult to "give all or part of [his] body" for certain designated purposes, including "transplantation, therapy, medical or dental education, research, or advancement of medical or dental science." 101 The revised UAGA (1984), in compliance with NOTA, does not, however, allow the donor to receive "valuable consideration" for the transfer.
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102 NOTA added a federal measure on top of the UAGA regulatory framework, which states simply that "it shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce."
103 Both the UAGA and NOTA provide for criminal penalties and fines for violation of any provision within the laws. Neither the UAGA nor NOTA defines "valuable consideration." The transfer of money in exchange for an organ seems to fall clearly within the scope and intent of each, yet it is unclear whether the same holds true for lesstraditional forms of exchange and economic interests, such as the expression of racial preferences. From a historical point of view, the ability of an individual to express and promote his or her racial preferences has economic value. For a Black organ donor desiring to correct a form of social injustice by channeling an organ donation to a Black patient person, this "secondary economic value" 105 is in excess of the implicit gratification received from simple altruistic gift-giving. Does this secondary economic interest constitute valuable consideration? Or does it color the donor's intent to such a degree that his gift of life is no longer considered altruistic?
The value individuals place on race is not trivial and has been considered in insightful, but limited contexts, such as schooling, 105. "Secondary" only in the sense that it is not directly quantifiable in terms of traditional economic measures such as money. In economic terms, this is known as a "shadow value." As conceived, this shadow price is a form of opportunity cost that would be lost by not participating as an organ donor. 108 Determining the value of racial identity and its impact on individual decisions remains difficult. The AAOTS studies suggest that whether a Black person decides to become an organ donor may be related to his or her perceptions about the allocation and procurement system's equity. 109 In economic terms, perceived inequity increases the cost of becoming an organ donor to Blacks. If this is correct, it costs Blacks more to participate in the organ procurement system than any other minority group, and Blacks receive on average fewer benefits of organ allocation. As a result, a cascade effect may emerge, whereby Blacks' perceptions of social injustice become reinforced and lead to even greater sensitivity to disparity in costs between themselves and non-Black donors. In essence, the greater cost of organ donation creates a disincentive for Black participation in the organ-procurement system. Ferreting out the exact contours of this economic relationship are beyond the scope of this article. The important point is simply that Black organ donors appear to place some value on the perceived inequities of the organ-transfer system.
To further unpack this theory, we examined Black self-help or rescue models from the civil-rights era. That Blacks might place an economic value on their racial identity is consistent with the civil-rights legacy of individuals foregoing their own self-interest in response to "group" challenges or to promote "group" uplift. Well, it happened to me. I was working at Summerton Motel, and this man, the work us, Greenborough, he work us real good. And the White Council, of Summerton, I think they call it the White Council, they came down there and told him that, if he didn't fire the women who signed the petition, that they would close the business down. They won't let the trucks come in and deliver. So then he called us in, and asked all who that signed the petition, would we take our name off the petition in order to work. After all, we had to pay $5 to take our name off the petition. I told him, no, I didn't want to do that, because we be hurting the children, and I rather give my job up, and keep my name on there. So in about two week's time, I was fired. Not only me, the rest of them who had anything to do with the petition, they all was fired. Annie Gibson was fired, and many more, during that time too. They-a lot of colored people on the white man place-they made them move, because they signed the petition. So they didn't have, well I guess they find a place to go. But when you live on white man place, partly all your life, and when you sign a petition for your children to do better, they told them, said, "Well you got to go. Else take the name off the petition." And many of the people decided they did not want to take the name off, and they did not take the name off. http://www.teachersdomain.org/assets/wgbh/iml04/iml04_doc_fullbriggs/iml04_doc_fullbriggs.pdf.
provide equitable accommodations and funding for schools. 111 In real economic terms, they suffered. Racial uplift had its costs, but it seems that to the participants in the civil-rights movement, "race advancement" was more valuable than money.
Black entertainers joined in by boycotting segregated music venues in the South, incurring economic losses and hostility from agents, touring, record companies and the broader entertainment industry.
112 According to Bennetta Jules-Rosette, Josephine Baker insisted "[f]rom the outset . . . that she perform only for integrated audiences at every venue."
113 She even insisted that curfew and segregation ordinances be lifted before she would perform. 114 Baker was not alone. Shortly before a concert in Augusta, Georgia, Ray Charles decided that he could no longer tolerate performing at segregated venues. In a recent biography, Michael Lydon describes Charles' frustration. A telegram informing Charles that his performance at Paine College would be to White students only, invoked this response, "I had to stand behind my principles and help the students in their fight" for desegregation. 115 His boycott came at a cost, as he was sued by concert promoters for breach of contract.
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Maids, shopkeepers, school teachers, and others across socioeconomic strata also risked the political and economic fallout from arrests and incarcerations resulting from marches and protests related specifically to race-focused ideals, such as the integration of schools in New Orleans and of lunch counters in Tennessee.
117 Indeed, the infamous walk in the spring of 1965 across the Edmund Pettus Bridge, commonly known as "Bloody Sunday," stands out as a moment that demonstrates in social, economic, and political contexts what Blacks were willing to wager for the right of other Blacks to vote. 118 The hundreds that marched across the bridge were not simply advocating for their 111 
B. Racial Preferences as Valued Consideration
The UNOS attempts to explain the contours of "valuable consideration" using the notion of donative intent. In essence, this distinction suggests that donations given in response to "valuable consideration" do not have the requisite altruistic intent. Some have gone so far as to suggest that "a preference might be considered 'valuable consideration' for an organ donation," and thus, "to avoid any confusion, laws that now ban compensation for organs should be amended to add this form of reciprocity/insurance to the list already exempted from such bans." 128 One thing is certain-determining donative intent is a tenuous proposition. Even within the UNOS policy itself, contradictions exist. For example, the UNOS condones "living donation arrangements" as not involving "valuable consideration," but condemns paired kidney transplants as counter to the intention of organ legislation even though in both cases the intentions of individual donors cases appear identical. 129 Of course, it can be argued that using racial preferences to encourage Blacks to become organ donors does not provide valuable consideration; rather, it merely directs donations toward a particular subpopulation. Unlike the case of a contract or paired transplant, donors would remain unaware of the identity of their organ recipient aside from the recipient's race. In turn, the relationship between donor and recipient remains attenuated enough that incentives for extra-legal arrangements are of no concern. The values individuals place on racial preferences often lie in tension with democratic principles promoting equality across racial strata. But this was not always the case. Through the 1950s and 1960s, legal segregation gave deference to individual racial preferences at the expense of equality, especially in elementary, secondary, and higher education in southern states. 131 Because the Supreme Court initially interpreted separate as equal in Plessy v. Ferguson, 132 this tension did not create constitutional concerns. 133 In turn, the Court protected the expression of White racial preferences and subgroup interest at the detriment of Blacks. In Brown v. Board of Education, the Court reversed its prior jurisprudence and refused to give deference to the expression of racial preferences when doing so was at the expense of equality across races.
134 Such concerns arose in the context of Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection claims. 135 Allowing organ donors to select the race of their recipients shifts the decision-making entity in organ allocation from the government to the individual. What remains, however, is to contemplate what role, if any, the government then has in enforcing antidiscrimination policies in the context of organ transfers. The constitutionality of government action is reviewed under strict scrutiny when it distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of racial classification. 136 As a threshold matter, the constitutionality of a race-based solution to organ supply which places the use of racial criteria at the discretion of potential donors should escape strict-scrutiny analysis. However, the state's role in such a program would likely not be de minimis, as the burdens of administering the race-based program might be assumed by the government.
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As such, it may be appropriate to analyze the constitutionality of the program in light of the strict-scrutiny framework, regardless of the nongovernmental nature of the decision-maker.
The Court stated in Grutter v. Bollinger that "[w]hen race-based action is necessary to further a compelling state interest such action does not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection so long as the narrow-tailoring requirement is also satisfied." 138 In the educational context, the Court has found that two such compelling government interests are remedying past intentional discrimination and increasing student body diversity in higher education. 139 As previously stated, the Court has found diversity in higher education to be a compelling interest under a strict-scrutiny analysis. 140 Allowing the use of racial preferences in an organ transfer system may be easily seen as a means to remedy past discrimination or save a life. Organ diversity, however, does not squarely map onto the Court's discussion of diversity as a compelling state interest under a constitutional strict-scrutiny analysis. According to Justice Roberts, "[t]he diversity interest was not focused on race alone but encompassed 'all factors that may contribute to student body diversity. ' Grutter, the Court held that a state law-school admissions process was narrowly tailored to obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body, even though it denied certain students admission to the law school on the basis of race. 142 The implication of Grutter is that a state may constitutionally restrict an individual's choice in attending a particular institution if a compelling diversity-based reason exists to do so. In the case of organ donation, no compelling diversity-based reason exists upon which limitations on individual choice may be justified. An organ recipient gains no additional utility by receiving an organ from a donor of a different race. Unlike racial preference in the education context, organ diversity does not seem a compelling reason to restrict individual choice. Rather, individuals should be allowed to choose if, and within broad categories, to whom they wish to donate their organs post mortem. 143 
D. Pitfalls of Race Preference?
Every institution has its drawbacks. 144 Some institutions are far more burdened than others and thus become less efficient and effective over time.
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Other institutions become the ideal (or at least less-burdened) mediums for transactions typically reserved for first-choice institutions. 146 What is important in each case is to match supply with demand. 147 Even in the best cases of equilibrium there may be externalities.
At first blush, one might want to analogize to the use of racial preferences in reproductive markets as another example of a race-positive transfer system. One drawback to comparing race preferences in organ versus reproductive markets, though, is that the two do not map evenly. The use of racial preferences in the adoption process and selection of sperm for artificial insemination is a family-planning decision. Though there is no explicit reference to family-planning decisions in the Constitution, these are the types of rights to which the government generally defers to individual choice. 148 Individual choices expressing racial preferences in organ markets, however, are not choices regarding family planning. Instead, such decisions center on issues of public health and safety-realms in which government regulation typically trumps individual preference. 149 Thus, critics of our proposal might argue that the state interest in maintaining a color-blind system of organ transfer is consistent with laws against organ commodification and hard-won civil-rights battles and should thus be upheld. But if we unpack the Court's decisions upon which such criticisms are based, it is clear that honoring racial preferences leads to a protection of individual choice through the privacy interest "implicit in the meaning of the Bill of Rights." 150 In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court held that this fundamental right encompassed a married couple's right to privacy when making family-planning decisions, including the decision to choose to use birth control. 151 Allowing racial preferences in deciding to whom an organ is given is not inconsistent with these principles. Critics might argue that race preference in organ transplantation is a form of reverse discrimination or that it would approve overt discrimination against Blacks by Whites who might choose to withhold their organs from Blacks (and all minorities). These arguments are seductive and commonly evoked in affirmative-action debates. 153 But do they have any real traction in the context of organ transplantation? These issues may be outside of the ambit of the Good Samaritan principles codified in NOTA and the application of that ethos in American culture and law. The truth is that we do not enforce a duty to rescue; it is absent from our common-law tradition. 154 
V

CONCLUSION
We proposed a simple thought experiment that, if viable, could serve as a solution to help ameliorate the problem of organ supply, particularly for Blacks.
The hypothesis pushing this article is that by allowing individual control over the recipients of their donated organs, more people will likely become donors. The idea is presently captured in the appeal of internet-based organ-donation sites like Matchingdonor.com. Self-selection is a tipping point for potential Black donors, with significant economic and social consequences. Not surprisingly, associations with any affinity group might help to facilitate an overall increase in organ donations. One could imagine Polish church groups in Chicago participating in an organ-sharing program or Albanian fraternities in California, and Cape Verdean community groups in Rhode Island doing the same.
Blacks remain suspicious of the U.S. medical system in general and of the transplant system in particular. In large part, their discomfort might stem from a history of being subjects of medical experiments without consent (or knowledge) and the facts that they wait longer for organs than any other racial group and that they experience the highest rates of death among all participants in the U.S. transplant system. Dismissing such concerns as irrational hyperbole fails to take into account the actual disparities resulting from the current transplant regime.
The use of racial preferences as a decision-making criterion addresses the distributional problems of organ allocation and could promote parity by giving organ suppliers some sense of control. Preferences are consistent with the way in which regulations function in other areas of biological transfer, such as the adoption process and the purchase of reproductive goods such as ova, sperm, and the renting of wombs for artificial insemination. The altruistic system of organ procurement and allocation is failing to provide an adequate supply of organs for those in need of life-saving transplantation. The critical issues, as of yet unresolved by the UNOS are how to increase organ supply and, holding all else equal, how to overcome resistance to organ sharing. In this article, we document that a significant, if not prevailing, reason for lower participation rates in Black communities is an underlying distrust of the transplant system. Based on the conclusions drawn from our hypotheses, permitting racial preferences in organ allocation directly addresses the concerns raised by Blacks.
